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THEORETICAL SPLITS AND CONSISTENT RESULTS ON 
ANONYMOUS POLITICAL SPEECH: MAJORS v. ABELL AND ACLU 
OF NEVADA v. HELLER 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In August of 2005, the citizens of Missouri voted to amend their state 
constitution to define marriage as a union between a man and a woman.1  
While the amendment was passed by a wide margin,2 the months preceding the 
vote were ones of lively debate on the issue.3  Organizations like churches and 
civil rights groups advanced their stances through television commercials and 
billboards.  Private individuals also found themselves especially active in the 
political discourse surrounding the issue, expressing their views on bumper 
stickers, around the water cooler, and at the corner tavern. 
About two weeks before the election, when it seemed that the political 
debate was at its height, the residents of my neighborhood found, on the 
windshield of their cars, small white pamphlets that appeared to have been 
printed on a home computer.  The fliers urged all to vote against gay marriage 
for the sake of protecting their souls on Judgment Day, because, as the flier 
argued, “homosexuality is an abominable sin that attaches even to those who 
support it.”  The small white paper listed several rather extreme rationales for 
supporting the amendment, most unmentioned by any large groups that were 
advocating through traditional media.  The pamphlet was unquestionably 
provocative and incited debates and speculations among neighbors.  It did not, 
however, provide any indication as to the identity of its author or distributor. 
Under Missouri law, this mystery pamphleteer’s conduct subjected her to 
prosecution for committing a class A misdemeanor—Missouri, along with 
nearly every other state, criminalizes this form of anonymity.4  While the 
regulations vary in their breadth, these campaign statutes generally require that 
 
 1. Matthew Franck, Foes of Gay Marriage Hope Vote is Catalyst, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Aug. 5, 2004, at A1.  The measure drew more votes than any other issue or race on 
the ballot.  Id. 
 2. The constitutional amendment defining marriage as “only between a man and a woman” 
passed with seventy-one percent support.  Id. 
 3. Matthew Franck, Friends and Foes Mobilize on Gay Marriage Measure, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH, July 26, 2004, at A9 (describing the large-scale grass-roots efforts by local 
groups supporting and opposing the amendment). 
 4. In 1995, forty-nine states had passed statutes like those described infra.  McIntyre v. 
Ohio Election Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 377 n.2 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
926 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50:925 
an author or sponsor disclose his or her identity on political literature 
pertaining to elections or ballot initiatives.5  However, several of these statutes 
have also been declared unenforceable as unconstitutional encroachments on 
First Amendment rights.6  So, while the mystery pamphleteer would be 
committing a crime, some courts would protect her actions, as she is exercising 
one of her most fundamental freedoms under the Bill of Rights. 
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”7  The text of the Amendment 
is deceptively simple.  Justice Hugo Black was fond of the phrase “no law 
means no law.”8  Still, Congress has repeatedly regulated free speech, and the 
courts, along with Justice Black himself, have found many of those regulations 
to be justified.9  On its face, the clause may appear to regulate only spoken and 
 
 5. For example, Missouri Revised Statute section 130.031(8) states that 
[a]ny person publishing, circulating, or distributing any printed matter relative to any 
candidate for public office or any ballot measure shall on the face of the printed matter 
identify in a clear and conspicuous manner the person who paid for the printed matter 
with the words “Paid for by” followed by the proper identification of the sponsor pursuant 
to this section. 
MO. REV. STAT. § 130.031(8) (2004).  The section goes on to exempt several articles, including 
personally created signs displayed at the home and articles and commentaries published in 
newspapers and periodicals.  Id.  It is also a violation of the statute to purposely provide false, 
misleading, or incomplete information in complying with the statute.  Id. § 130.031(11).  Any 
person who purposely violates these sections is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, which subjects 
her to up to one year of imprisonment.  Id. §§ 130.081(1), 558.011(1)(5) (2004).  There is also a 
federal campaign disclaimer statute.  2 U.S.C. § 441(d) (2000). 
 6. See ACLU of Nev. v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussed infra note 92).  
Other state disclosure statutes have also been declared unconstitutional, but not as First 
Amendment violations.  For example, in Commonwealth v. Dennis, 329 N.E.2d 706 (Mass. 
1975), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered a statute that made it a crime to 
write or distribute any circular designed to aid or defeat any candidate or any question submitted 
to the votes unless it contained the name of the voter responsible.  Id. at 707.  The court struck 
down the statute on equal protections ground.  Id. at 707–10.  See Erika King, Comment, 
Anonymous Campaign Literature and the First Amendment, 21 N.C. CENT. L.J. 144, 160 n.102 
(1995), for a description of similar court decisions. 
 7. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 8. DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 1 (1998).  Justice Black was an absolutist 
free speech supporter, who regarded the First Amendment as crucial to the survival of democracy. 
  For the Judge, the “important thing was that the people have an opportunity to hear 
all sides of [an issue] and to decide freely what laws they want to live by. . . .  It was this 
view that led [him] to place such heavy emphasis upon the First Amendment as the basic 
law guaranteeing the right of the people to open discussion of public issues.”  The 
underlying premise of the First Amendment was that, if the people heard all sides of an 
issue, however controversial or heretical the ideas might be, they would choose “the 
better, wiser, more beneficial of alternative courses.” 
HOWARD BALL, HUGO L. BLACK: COLD STEEL WARRIOR 189 (1996) (alterations in original) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 9. FARBER, supra note 8, at 1. 
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written expression, but other forms of expression, like symbolic expression, 
have fallen within the purview of First Amendment protection.10  The First 
Amendment even extends protection to some particular “absences of 
expression”—anonymous speech. 
The right to anonymous speech is closely tied to the topic of political 
expression, where a speaker’s identity can have an exceptional influence on the 
message’s recipients.11  As the Supreme Court has recognized, “[a]nonymous 
pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an important role in 
the progress of mankind,”12 and, despite the growing prevalence of consumer 
registration procedures and heightened security measures that demand self-
identification, anonymity has remained a meaningful aspect of the day-to-day 
life of most ordinary citizens.13 
In 1995 the Supreme Court decided the controlling case on anonymous 
political speech, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission.14  In McIntyre the 
Supreme Court considered a challenge to an Ohio statute that required any 
written communication designed to influence voters in an election to contain 
the name and address of the party responsible for paying for or producing the 
communication.15  The Court held that the statute was an unconstitutional 
abridgement of the right to engage in anonymous political speech.16  The 
McIntyre decision left open several issues regarding political speech and 
anonymity, and lower courts have struggled over what factual distinctions 
might produce a different outcome on the constitutionality of this type of 
statute. 
This Note examines the link between anonymous speech and political 
expression by analyzing two recent federal court of appeals decisions, Majors 
 
 10. Id.; see, e.g., Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 414–15 (1974) (holding that a college 
student’s display of an American Flag upside down with a peace sign on it was protected 
symbolic expression under the First Amendment).  The development of the Courts’ jurisprudence 
on anonymous speech will be analyzed infra. 
 11. “[I]n the field of political rhetoric . . . ‘the identity of the speaker is an important 
component of many attempts to persuade.’”  ACLU of Nev. v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 
2004) (quoting City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994)). 
 12. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960). 
 13. See Lee Tien, Who’s Afraid of Anonymous Speech? McIntyre and the Internet, 75 OR. L. 
REV. 117, 117 (1996) (“Unless you’re a celebrity, you’re effectively unknown as you schlepp 
through the big city.  Suicide hotlines, Alcoholics Anonymous, and the secret ballot are 
conventional examples of socially legitimate, institutionalized anonymity practices.”).  The 
everyday experience of anonymity is especially relevant in most law schools, where the practice 
of blind grading is meant to ensure, at least in part, that a student’s actual performance on the 
exam, and not any improper influence, is the exclusive factor in determining her final score. 
 14. 514 U.S. 334 (1995). 
 15. Id. at 338. 
 16. Id. at 357. 
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v. Abell17 and ACLU of Nevada v. Heller.18  Both decide the constitutionality 
of state statutes that limit an individual’s or group’s right to engage in 
anonymous political speech by requiring those parties to include their identity 
on any political advertising materials they produce.19  In Majors, the Seventh 
Circuit upheld an Indiana statute requiring political advertising to identify the 
people who paid for the advertising.20  Six months later, in Heller, the Ninth 
Circuit struck down a similar Nevada statute.21  The Ninth Circuit did make 
some attempt to distinguish its ruling from that of Majors,22 but the two 
opinions are openly at odds with each other in several ways.23 
To lay a foundation for analyzing Majors and Heller, this Note first 
describes the significant role of anonymity in the formation and early history 
of this country.  It then provides a brief overview of the modern Supreme 
Court case law on anonymous political speech, with a more thorough 
explanation and analysis of McIntyre.  This Note next reviews some lower 
court decisions on anonymous political speech since McIntyre, which illustrate 
some of the questions and problems that McIntyre left unresolved. 
The remainder of the Note will focus on the Seventh Circuit’s decision in 
Majors and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Heller.  First, it will summarize the 
facts and holdings of the cases, as well as the analyses used by the two courts.  
The Note will then contrast the courts’ approaches to resolving their similar 
cases and will argue that, while the outcomes of the two cases are reconcilable, 
the courts’ decisions were driven by contrasting legal and theoretical 
presumptions, illustrating two very different approaches to state statutes that 
regulate political communications by requiring the messenger to disclose her 
identity on the communication.  After drawing out the more significant 
distinctions between the decisions, this Note concludes by arguing that upon 
the Supreme Court’s re-confrontation with the issue, it should follow the Ninth 
Circuit’s preferable approach to anonymous political speech. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A. History of Anonymous Speech Under the First Amendment 
In cases questioning anonymity and the First Amendment, the historical 
use of anonymity, especially by the Constitution’s framers, has been 
 
 17. 361 F.3d 349 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 18. 378 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 19. Majors, 361 F.3d at 350; Heller, 378 F.3d at 981. 
 20. 361 F.3d at 355. 
 21. 378 F.3d at 1002. 
 22. Id. at 1000–02. 
 23. See infra notes 174–222 and accompanying text. 
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persuasive to and regularly referenced by modern courts.24  The framers’ exact 
intent regarding the meaning and importance of the First Amendment is 
unclear.25  However, the Supreme Court has interpreted the purpose of the First 
Amendment as closely tied to the political process, ensuring a lively 
marketplace of ideas: “[It was intended] ‘to secure the widest possible 
dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources’ and ‘to 
assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and 
social changes desired by the people.’”26 
Judging from the history of the Framers’ own actions when forming the 
union, it is likely that their notions of free speech were meant to include 
anonymous speech.27  “[T]he early political climate of the United States was 
replete with anonymous writings.”28  For example, perhaps the most famous 
lone pamphleteer, Thomas Paine, published his Common Sense—known as the 
work that first inspired many Americans to consider separating from Great 
Britain—under the pseudonym of “An Englishman.”29 Alexander Hamilton, 
John Jay, and James Madison originally published the Federalist Papers under 
 
 24. See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 343 (1995) (referring to 
the “respected tradition of anonymity in the advocacy of political causes”) (footnote omitted); 
Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960) (“Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and 
even books have played an important role in the progress of mankind.  Persecuted groups and 
sects from time to time throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and 
laws either anonymously or not at all.”); State v. N.D. Educ. Ass’n, 262 N.W.2d 731, 735 (N.D. 
1978) (“It is worth remembering that among the glories of our nation’s history are documents 
written under pseudonyms by men who were to become the second, third and fourth 
Presidents . . . the first Chief Justice and the first Secretary of the Treasury and Secretary of State 
of the United States.”); People v. Duryea, 351 N.Y.S.2d 978, 989 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974) 
(“Anonymity has been, historically, the medium of dissidents, shielding them from the retaliatory 
power of the establishment and, whether their fears of reprisal were justified or not, encouraging 
them to express unpopular views.  Anonymous writings have an honored place in our political 
heritage.”). 
 25. The legislative record surrounding the adoption of the First Amendment is unhelpful.  
FARBER, supra note 8, at 9–10. 
 26. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 49 (1976) (citations omitted); see also McIntyre, 514 U.S. 
at 346 (“[A] major purpose of [the] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of 
governmental affairs.”). 
 27. For a persuasive argument that history almost certainly proves that the Framers 
originally viewed anonymity as a vital part of free speech, see Jonathan Turley, Registering 
Publius: The Supreme Court and the Right to Anonymity, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 57, 58–61 (2001–
2002).  But see the dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia in McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 371–85.  There, 
Justice Scalia concluded that historical evidence was inconclusive as to whether anonymous 
political speech merited constitutional protection.  Id. at 373–76; see also Amy Constantine, 
Note, What’s in a Name? McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission: An Examination of the 
Protection Afforded to Anonymous Political Speech, 29 CONN. L. REV. 459, 466–67 (1996). 
 28. Jennifer B. Wieland, Note, Death of Publius: Toward a World Without Anonymous 
Speech, 17 J.L. & POL. 589, 591 (2001). 
 29. Id. at 591–92. 
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the joint pseudonym of “Publius.”30  Their opponents in discourse also 
published under various pseudonyms.31  Benjamin Franklin regularly wrote 
under assumed names.32  This tradition of using anonymity when attempting to 
persuade the public continued into the early years of this country.33 
However, even the earliest use of anonymity had its controversies.  While 
the use of anonymity in the country’s formational years is now regarded as 
heroic,34 it was met with its fair share of opposition at the time.35  For example, 
“[t]he Continental Congress tried to uncover the identity of the writer known 
as ‘Leonidas’ after he accused Congress of corruption and ineptitude.”36  In 
New Jersey, early legislators sought out the identity of “Cincinnatus” to charge 
him with sedition.37  The printer of “Cincinnatus” would not reveal the 
author’s identity, declaring: “Were I to comply . . . I conceive I should betray 
the trust reposed in me, and be far from acting as a faithful guardian of the 
Liberty of the Press.”38 
B. Modern Supreme Court Decisions on Anonymous Political Speech 
Despite attacks, the tool of anonymity has continued to be a regular choice 
of those wishing to express their opinions and persuade others.39  Despite the 
continuous use of anonymity, it was more than 170 years after the first 
Federalist Papers were published before the Supreme Court recognized a right 
to anonymity.  In 1958, the Court tentatively affirmed a right to anonymous 
group membership in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson.40  There, the Court 
held that the state could not compel the NAACP to turn over its membership 
lists because it would violate the members’ rights to freely associate in 
 
 30. Id. at 592. 
 31. Id. 
 32. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341 n.4 (1995) (citing 2 W. BRUCE, 
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN SELF-REVEALED: A BIOGRAPHICAL AND CRITICAL STUDY BASED MAINLY 
ON HIS OWN WRITINGS ch. 5 (2d ed. 1923)). 
 33. “It has been asserted that, between 1789 and 1809, six presidents, fifteen cabinet 
members, twenty senators, and thirty-four congressmen published anonymous political writings.” 
Wieland, supra note 28, at 592 (citing Comment, The Constitutional Right to Anonymity: Free 
Speech, Disclosure and the Devil, 70 YALE L.J. 1084, 1085 (1961)). 
 34. “Under our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious, fraudulent 
practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent.” McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 357. 
 35. See Turley, supra note 27, at 60. 
 36. Id. (citing Justice Thomas’ concurrence in McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 361–62). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. (quoting R. HIXON & ISAAC COLLINS, A QUAKER PRINTER IN 18TH CENTURY 
AMERICA 95 (1968)). 
 39. For example, Samuel Clemens (Mark Twain), Mary Ann Evans (George Eliot), and Eric 
Blair (George Orwell) are among the many who have chosen, for various reasons, to publish 
under pseudonyms.  See, e.g., Turley, supra note 27, at 57. 
 40. 357 U.S. 449, 466 (1958); see also Wieland, supra note 28, at 594–95.  The first of the 
Federalist Papers was printed in 1787.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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privacy.41  In 1960, the Court addressed anonymous speech directly in Talley v. 
California,42 discussed below.  Since then, the Court has gradually begun to fill 
in gaps by defining what guarantees the First Amendment provides with 
respect to anonymous speech. 
1. Talley v. California 
In Talley v. California, the Court considered the constitutionality of a city 
ordinance that forbade any person from distributing any handbill that did not 
have printed on it the name of the person who “printed, wrote, compiled or 
manufactured the same” and the name of the person who “caused the same to 
be distributed.”43  Justice Hugo Black, an unapologetic supporter of free 
speech, wrote for the majority.44  The Court held that the statute was 
unconstitutional, reasoning that it was an overbroad method of achieving the 
state’s purported interests of protecting against fraud, false advertising, and 
libel.45  The Court recognized the historical importance of anonymous speech46 
and rationalized that the ordinance would greatly hinder freedom of expression 
because the “fear of reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful discussions of 
public matters of importance.”47 
2. Buckley v. Valeo 
In the highly complex Buckley v. Valeo,48 the Court ruled that some rights 
to anonymity could be sacrificed for compelling state interests.  In Buckley, the 
Court confronted various challenges to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 
1974.49  The Act, passed after the Watergate scandal, was motivated by 
concerns about corruption during the Nixon Administration and a general 
belief that the rising costs of campaigns forced politicians to spend more time 
fundraising than tending to their official duties.50  One set of provisions 
regulated contribution and expenditure limits, a second set imposed disclosure 
and reporting requirements, and a third set established a system of public 
funding for presidential campaigns.51 
 
 41. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 466. 
 42. 362 U.S. 60 (1960). 
 43. Id. at 60–61 (quoting LOS ANGELES, CAL., CODE § 28.06 (1960)). 
 44. Id. at 60. 
 45. Id. at 63–65. 
 46. See id. at 64–65, for a lengthy discussion of significant anonymous writings throughout 
England and the United States during colonial times. 
 47. Talley, 362 U.S. at 65. 
 48. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 49. Id. at 7; Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263. 
 50. See FARBER, supra note 8, at 234. 
 51. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 10–11. 
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The Court’s treatment of the disclosure and reporting requirements was 
“an important step in anonymous speech jurisprudence.”52  While the Court 
observed that contributing to a campaign is a form of expression and that a 
requirement forcing disclosure of contributions might deter some from 
contributing if they could not do so anonymously,53 it nevertheless upheld the 
disclosure requirements of the statute because the governmental interests were 
sufficient to pass the test of “exacting scrutiny.”54 
The Buckley decision did recognize expenditures and contributions as 
political speech and did allow for certain state abridgement of that political 
speech.55  Still, as the Supreme Court would later make clear, it is not this type 
of “symbolic expression” that is closest to the heart of the rationale for First 
Amendment protection for anonymous speech because “even though money 
may ‘talk,’ its speech is less specific, less personal, and less provocative than a 
handbill—and as a result, when money supports an unpopular viewpoint it is 
less likely to precipitate retaliation.”56 
3. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission 
Almost twenty years after Buckley, the Supreme Court faced a different 
type of election regulation, but this time the government’s interests were 
insufficient to justify the restrictions on free speech.  In the landmark case of 
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,57 the Court dealt with the issue of 
whether an Ohio statute that prohibited the distribution of anonymous 
campaign literature abridged the First Amendment right to freedom of 
speech.58 
a. Facts and Holding 
In 1988, Margaret McIntyre appeared at a public meeting regarding a 
proposed school tax levy.59  McIntyre, acting almost completely 
independently, distributed leaflets expressing her opposition to the tax levy.60  
While some of the leaflets identified McIntyre as the author, others were 
merely signed by “CONCERNED PARENTS AND TAXPAYERS.”61  Several 
 
 52. Wieland, supra note 28, at 597. 
 53. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68. 
 54. Id. at 60–84. 
 55. Id. at 64–69. 
 56. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 355 (1995). 
 57. Id. at 334.  Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.  Id. at 335.  Justices 
Ginsburg and Thomas both concurred and filed separate opinions.  Id.  Justice Scalia filed a 
dissenting opinion, which Chief Justice Rehnquist joined.  Id. 
 58. Id. at 336. 
 59. Id. at 337. 
 60. Id. 
 61. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 337. 
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months later, a school official filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections 
Commission charging that McIntyre’s distribution of the anonymous leaflets 
violated the Ohio statute at issue.62  The Commission imposed a fine of 
$100.00.63 
The Supreme Court recognized that the actual monetary stakes in the case 
were quite low, but granted certiorari regarding the constitutionality of the 
statute because of the issue’s great importance.64  Unlike the city statute under 
fire in Talley, which prohibited all anonymous hand billing “in any place under 
any circumstances,”65 Ohio’s statute applied only “to unsigned documents 
designed to influence voters in an election.”66  Despite the Ohio statute’s 
narrower scope, the Court decided that the reasoning of Talley supported its 
ultimate conclusion that the state’s interests in protecting the electoral 
process—specifically, providing the electorate with relevant information and 
preventing fraudulent and libelous statements—did not justify the state’s 
attempt to limit free speech.67 
The Court quickly disposed of Ohio’s purported state interest of fostering 
an informed electorate by likening an author’s identity to any other content that 
the author may choose to include or exclude.68  “The simple interest in 
providing voters with additional relevant information does not justify a state 
requirement that a writer make statements or disclosures she would otherwise 
omit.”69  Overall, the Court’s rejection of this purported state interest revealed 
its stance that the electorate was fully capable of taking into consideration the 
anonymity of the message when evaluating the significance of that message.70 
b. Unfinished Business 
While the Court made clear that it was extending protection to anonymous 
political speech under the First Amendment, and that Ohio’s statute was 
certainly not narrowly tailored, it left a great deal unsaid about what might tip 
the constitutional scales for similar statutes. 
The opinion implies an extensive list of factors that might cause a different 
outcome: a statutory exception for “individuals acting independently and using 
their own modest resources,” regulatory coverage of exclusively candidate-
 
 62. Id. at 338. 
 63. Id. 
 64. See id. at 340–41. 
 65. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 60 (1960). 
 66. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 344. 
 67. Id. at 348–51, 357.  “[P]olitical speech by its nature will sometimes have unpalatable 
consequences, and, in general, our society accords greater weight to the value of free speech than 
to the dangers of its misuse.”  Id. at 357. 
 68. Id. at 348–49. 
 69. Id. at 348. 
 70. Constantine, supra note 27, at 463. 
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related speech (and not ballot issues), a stronger temporal relationship between 
the election and the release of the message, an exception for speakers who fear 
reprisal, “a dollar threshold that would track campaign expenditure laws,” 
language tailored to regulate only false or misleading messages, and the “type 
of information the speaker must provide.”71  The Court’s shortcomings on 
clarity did not go unnoticed by the dissent or scholarly critics.72 
C. Early Aftermath of McIntyre 
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, wrote a highly critical 
dissent in McIntyre, attacking several of the majority’s assumptions and 
conclusions.73  Near the conclusion of his opinion, Justice Scalia scolded the 
majority for the practical problem of failing to announce a clear rule of law and 
forecasted an inevitable era of judicial uncertainty regarding anonymous 
political speech: 
[A]fter having announced that this statute, because it “burdens core political 
speech,” requires “‘exacting scrutiny’” and must be “narrowly tailored to serve 
an overriding state interest,” (ordinarily the kiss of death), the opinion goes on 
to proclaim soothingly (and unhelpfully) that “a State’s enforcement interest 
might justify a more limited identification requirement.” . . . Perhaps, then, not 
all the state statutes I have alluded to are invalid, but just some of them; or 
indeed maybe all of them remain valid in “larger circumstances”!  It may take 
decades to work out the shape of this newly expanded right-to-speak-
incognito, even in the elections field.74 
 
 71. Id. at 477, 477 nn.104–07. 
 72. See id. at 477–81; Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly Easy Case for Disclosure of 
Contributions and Expenditures Funding Sham Issue Advocacy, 3 ELECTION L.J. 251, 252 (2004) 
(“Was the right to anonymous speech recognized in McIntyre limited to those persons engaging 
in face-to-face communications, leaving laws requiring disclosure in separately-filed reports 
constitutionally sound?  Did it matter that the McIntyre plaintiff was a lone pamphleteer using 
modest personal resources, in which case McIntyre left undisturbed laws requiring disclosure in 
‘other, larger circumstances?’  Did the McIntyre right to anonymity extend only to ballot measure 
elections and not to candidate elections?”). 
 73. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 371–85.  Justice Scalia challenged the majority’s conclusion that 
because the Framers engaged in anonymous political speech, it is clear that anonymous political 
speech was meant to fall within First Amendment protections.  Id. at 372–73 (“But to prove that 
anonymous electioneering was used frequently is not to establish that it is a constitutional right.”).  
Instead, Justice Scalia put forth an ongoing history argument of constitutional interpretation, 
citing the forty-nine state statutes very similar to Ohio’s.  Id. at 375–77 (“Such a universal and 
long-established American legislative practice must be given precedence, I think, over historical 
and academic speculation regarding a restriction that assuredly does not go to the heart of free 
speech.”). 
 74. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 380–81 (citations omitted).  Justice Scalia was especially critical 
of Justice Ginsburg’s concurring opinion, which stressed that “[i]n for a calf is not always in for a 
cow. . . . We do not thereby hold that the State may not in other, larger circumstances require the 
speaker to disclose its interest by disclosing its identity.”  Id. at 358. 
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Nearly one decade has passed, and it appears that Justice Scalia’s forecast is 
coming true.  Legislatures have struggled with what to make of McIntyre,75 as 
have the courts. 
For example, in State v. Doe,76 the Texas Court of Appeals held that a 
section of the state’s election code, similar to that of Ohio in McIntyre, was an 
unconstitutional burden on free speech.77  While the Texas statute would not 
apply to individuals acting independently with their own modest resources, the 
court did not find this factual difference worthy of distinguishing it from 
McIntyre.78  In its analysis, the court found the statute to be a burden on core 
political speech,79 subjected it to “exacting scrutiny,”80 and recognized the 
 
 75. In his May 5, 1999 testimony before the House Subcommittee on the Constitution of the 
Committee on the Judiciary, David M. Mason, Commissioner of the Federal Election 
Commission, reviewed several of the lower court decisions applying McIntyre, advising Congress 
that it “would be well served to consider carefully how (if at all) to expand disclosure 
requirements, rather than simply treating more disclosure as automatically better.  The trend in 
court decisions indicates that we face at least some risk of having even current disclosure 
requirements struck down or narrowed.”  First Amendment and Restrictions on Political Speech: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 
31 (1999) (statement of David M. Mason, Commissioner, Federal Election Commission).  For a 
discussion of the variance in several state legislative responses to McIntyre’s holding, see 
Constantine, supra note 27, at 478–81. 
 76. 61 S.W.3d 99 (Tex. App. 2001). 
 77. Id. at 101.  Section 255.001 of the Texas Election Code provided that a person may not 
enter into an agreement to publish political advertising that does not indicate in the advertising: 
(1) that it is political advertising; (2) the full name of either the individual who personally 
entered into the contract or agreement with the printer . . . and (3) . . . the address of either 
the individual who personally entered into the agreement with the printer or publisher or 
the person that individual represents. 
TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 255.001 (2003). 
 78. Doe, 61 S.W.3d at 103. 
A person’s decision to [publish a political advertisement alone, without the involvement 
of another] severely limits his or her opportunity to engage meaningfully in the 
anonymous dissemination of political ideas to any significant portion of the electorate. . . . 
At best, the statute prevents all but the most resourceful individuals from engaging in the 
publication of political advertising without revealing their identity. 
Id. 
 79. Id.  Exactly what type of speech is properly categorized as “core political speech” is a 
matter of controversy.  Cass Sunstein has argued that speech that lies at the “core” of First 
Amendment protection is overtly “political speech”; that is, speech that is “both intended and 
received as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue.” CASS R. SUNSTEIN, 
DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 130 (1993).  Speech that is not “self-
consciously political” lies outside the core.  Id. at 152–54.  For a criticism that Sunstein’s 
conception of core political speech is far too narrow, see William Marshall, Free Speech and the 
“Problem” of Democracy, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 191, 194 (1994). 
 80. Id. (quoting McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 347 (1995)). 
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state’s interest in regulating elections as significant,81 but ultimately held that 
the statute was not “narrowly tailored” because each of the state’s interests was 
already addressed in other legislation, stating that “[a] state cannot 
significantly infringe upon an individual’s freedom of speech simply to obtain 
the ancillary benefit of detecting violations of other laws.”82 
But, in Seymour v. Elections Enforcement Commission,83 the Connecticut 
Supreme Court upheld the state’s disclosure statute, even under the ordinary 
“kiss of death” of exacting scrutiny.84  The court conducted the same balancing 
of the individual’s right to engage in free speech and the state’s interest in 
ensuring fair and honest elections.85  Affording a significant deference to the 
state’s interest in regulating elections,86 the court found that all of the state 
interests—the “big three” of preventing fraud and corruption, assisting with the 
enforcement of other campaign laws, and informing voters—were compelling, 
and that the statute was narrowly tailored to meet those interests.87  Grasping 
on to some of the factors left open in McIntyre, the Connecticut court found the 
statue was permissible because it did not regulate individuals acting 
independently88 and because it pertained only to “communication discussing 
candidates for election or the solicitation of funds for political parties.”89 
III.  2004 CIRCUIT SPLIT 
A. Background 
Seymour and Doe, discussed above, are only two examples of several 
lower court struggles to interpret McIntyre.90  The struggle continued into 
 
 81. Id. at 103–04.  The state put forth three main interests: the statute deterred and punished 
political corruption, served to notify the public of any allegiance a particular candidate might 
have with another publisher, and provided a method for detecting expenditures that appeared to 
be from individuals but actually came from corporations or Political Action Committees.  Id. at 
103; see also Wieland, supra note 28, at 611–12. 
 82. Doe, 61 S.W.3d at 106. 
 83. 762 A.2d 880 (Conn. 2000). 
 84. Id. at 884, 892.  In his McIntyre dissent, Justice Scalia labeled the exacting scrutiny 
standard as “ordinarily the kiss of death.”  McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 380. 
 85. Seymour, 762 A.2d at 885. 
 86. Id.  “Indeed, ‘there must be a substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and 
honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.’”  
Id. (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)). 
 87. Id. at 885–94. 
 88. Id. at 891. 
 89. Id. at 892.  For a more extensive discussion of the difference between the regulations of 
candidate-related communications and issue-related communications, see discussion infra at 
notes 165–68 and accompanying text. 
 90. Compare Doe v. Mortham, 708 So. 2d 929, 934–35 (Fla. 1998) (interpreting a statute 
requiring any independent political advertisement to indicate the name and address of the person 
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2004, when Majors v. Abell,91 in the Seventh Circuit, and ACLU of Nevada v. 
Heller,92 in the Ninth Circuit, were decided six months apart.  These two cases 
are clearly not the first decisions to contemplate state statutes that abridge 
citizens’ rights to engage in anonymous political speech.  Majors and Heller 
merit close analysis, however, because they highlight two prevalent post-
McIntyre perspectives on anonymous political speech, as well as the major 
issues surrounding the topic. 
The two courts conducted their analyses in light of a 2003 Supreme Court 
decision, McConnell v. Federal Election Commission93 and differed in their 
conclusions on its import to the current body of jurisprudence on anonymous 
political speech.  McConnell considered constitutional challenges to new 
disclosure rules in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA)94 and 
will be explained further below. 
B. Facts and Holdings of the Cases 
1. Majors v. Abell 
A group of candidates and individuals brought a constitutional challenge to 
a provision of the Indiana election laws that required any political advertising 
expressly advocating for the election or defeat of a candidate to include 
 
who paid for the advertisement as content-neutral and distinguishing it from McIntyre because the 
Florida court interpreted the statute as not applying to lone individuals), and Gable v. Patton, 142 
F.3d 940, 944–45 (6th Cir. 1998) (finding a statute requiring all advertisements advocating for a 
particular candidate to identify their sponsor, when subjected to strict scrutiny, was narrowly 
tailored for governmental interest in preventing corruption and providing state with method of 
detecting expenditures that are not truly independent), and Ky. Right to Life, Inc. v. Terry, 108 
F.3d 637, 646–48 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding a state statute requiring on-communication 
identification disclaimers only for independent expenditures narrowly tailored because it did not 
regulate issue advocacy), with Citizens for Responsible Gov’t State Political Action Comm. v. 
Davidson, 236 F.3d 1174, 1198–99 (10th Cir. 2000) (recognizing a “constitutionally significant 
difference” between on-communication identification and disclosure requirements and striking 
down a section of campaign statute requiring donors who make independent expenditures in 
excess of $1,000 to include identifying information in any political message produced by the 
expenditure because the section was not narrowly tailored to any state interests), and Stewart v. 
Taylor, 953 F. Supp. 1047, 1054–55 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (holding that state election campaign statute 
which prohibited anonymous electoral campaign literature was not narrowly tailored to meet a 
compelling state interest and thus violated candidate’s right to freedom of speech because “[t]he 
statute burden[ed] dissemination of campaign literature that [was] informative as well as 
misleading”; also arguing that the Court’s “discussion of anonymous political expression 
specifically finds its value to campaigns for political office as great if not greater than its value to 
referenda”). 
 91. 361 F.3d 349 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 92. 378 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 93. 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
 94. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 93–94; Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81. 
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adequate notice of the identity of persons who paid for the advertising.95  
Violation of the statute constituted a misdemeanor.96  While the text of the 
statute required that a “disclaimer” appear on the political advertising 
materials, the Court correctly pointed out that “disclaimer” is a misnomer.97  
What the statute actually required would be more appropriately named a 
“disclosure”; however, that term “has been appropriated to describe a reporting 
requirement,” commonly used when referring to the requirements of campaign 
finance laws that mandate the registering of financial amounts spent on 
political advertising.98 
There was controversy in the state supreme court about the statutory 
meaning of “persons” to whom the statute was applicable.99  The state argued 
that the statute only applied to candidates and certain party and political action 
committees.100  On practical grounds,101 the Indiana Supreme Court held that 
the statute applied to “any individual or organization.”102 
a. Majority Opinion 
In deciding upon the constitutionality of the Indiana statute, Judge Posner, 
writing for the majority, described the Seventh Circuit’s difficult task as 
entailing a “balancing of imponderables.”103  In one respect, disallowing 
anonymous political advertising might reduce the quantity of political 
advertising because some advertisers may be unwilling to reveal their 
identities.104  On the other hand, requiring political advertisers to include their 
 
 95. Majors, 361 F.3d at 350.  The challenge was brought against Indiana Code §3-9-3-2.5, 
which is a rather lengthy provision.  Majors v. Abell, 792 N.E.2d 22, 24 & n.1 (Ind. 2003).  In 
summary, the section required that “any ‘person’ must include a ‘disclaimer’ in ‘general public 
political advertising’ if the person either ‘solicits a contribution’ or finances ‘communications 
expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.’”  Id. at 24.  The 
section also included special requirements for different disclosures “depending on whether the 
material is authorized and/or financed by a candidate, a candidate’s committee . . . or a party 
organization.”  Id. 
 96. IND. CODE ANN. § 3-14-1-3 (2002). 
 97. Majors, 361 F.3d at 350. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Majors, 792 N.E.2d at 24. 
 100. Id. at 24–25. 
 101. The court recognized that, in application, it would make very little sense if “persons” 
subject to the statute were limited to just candidates or committees: 
If a message is such that the candidate would not be willing to be identified with it, 
presumably if its authorship leaked the effect of the leak would be to brand the candidate 
a sneak as well as a fool.  We think the statute is primarily concerned with anonymous 
advertising by third parties. 
Id. at 29. 
 102. Id. at 30. 
 103. Majors v. Abell, 361 F.3d 349, 352 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 104. Id. 
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names on their materials, the court reasoned, would increase the quality of the 
political advertising because the additional information will be useful to 
voters.105 
At the outset, the court distinguished the Indiana statute from the Ohio 
statute invalidated in McIntyre.106  While the Ohio statute’s identification 
requirements applied to issue ads, the Indiana statute applied only to candidate 
ads.107 
The court next considered what impact, if any, the Supreme Court’s ruling 
in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission might have on McIntyre’s rule 
that the government may not forbid the distribution of anonymous campaign 
literature.108  The Majors court likened the Indiana statute to the BCRA 
regulation of “electioneering communications.”109  In McConnell, the Supreme 
Court upheld the BCRA’s requirement that individuals who spend more than 
$10,000 producing electioneering communications or contribute at least $1,000 
to an organization that produces them must report their identities to the Federal 
Election Commission.110  Following the reasoning of Buckley v. Valeo, the 
Supreme Court upheld the reporting requirement because it served the state 
interests of providing the electorate with information, deterring actual 
corruption or the appearance of corruption, and gathering the data necessary to 
enforce some of the substantive electioneering restrictions.111 
The court likened the Indiana statute to the regulation of electioneering 
communication in the BCRA because both provided identity information to the 
public.112  Compared with a reporting requirement, an on-communication 
identification requirement like Indiana’s had the same effect of destroying 
anonymity, making would-be advertisers more susceptible to retaliation, 
should they garner unpopular viewpoints.  But, as the Majors court recognized, 
“having to identify [oneself] to the entire audience for the ad has as a practical 
 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 351. 
 107. Id.  The significance of this distinction lies in the state’s justified interest in the 
regulation.  “In candidate elections, [the state] can identify a compelling state interest in avoiding 
the corruption that might result from campaign expenditures.”  McIntyre v. Ohio Elections 
Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 356 (1995).  While corruption concerns are arguably a compelling state 
interest in candidate elections, they are not significant in the context of an issue referendum.  First 
Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790 (1978).  Still, the public interest in knowing 
the source of a message is likely as great in one case as in the other.  See infra discussion in text 
accompanying notes 207–08. 
 108. Majors, 361 F.3d at 352–54. 
 109. Id. at 352–53.  The act defines electioneering communications as advertisements 
broadcast within 60 days of a general election or 30 days of a primary that refer to a candidate for 
federal office.  2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i) (2004). 
 110. McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 194–96 (2003). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Majors, 361 F.3d at 353. 
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matter a greater inhibiting effect than just a reporting requirement does because 
it broadcasts the advertiser’s name to the entire electoral community.”113  In 
turn, the Court also acknowledged that the state interest of informing the public 
was less served by a reporting requirement than by an on-communication 
identification requirement because fewer people are likely to see a report 
registered with the FEC.114 
The court also considered the argument that McConnell regarded campaign 
financing (rather than those who paid for political ads themselves), and was 
therefore inapplicable to the analysis of the Indiana statute.115  The court 
rejected this argument, however, heavily persuaded that both types of laws 
were intended to serve the same state interest of informing the public.116  The 
court admitted its reluctance to disturb the state’s judgment without stronger 
guidance from the Supreme Court, and concluded that despite the differences 
between the BCRA and the Indiana disclaimer statute, the Supreme Court’s 
holding in McConnell sanctioned the Indiana statute’s infringement on the 
right to anonymous speech.117 
b. Dubitante Opinion 
Judge Easterbrook filed a dubitante opinion118 to express his uncertainty 
with several of the majority’s assertions, especially its interpretation of 
McConnell’s implications on McIntyre.119  Easterbrook was similarly frustrated 
with a lack of a clear standard from the Supreme Court.120  But, unlike the 
majority, Easterbrook is highly suspicious that McConnell actually provided 
any controlling authority on this particular set of facts. 
First, Easterbrook noted that Indiana’s statute was markedly different from 
the federal BCRA statute in McConnell.  The Indiana statute “start[ed] from a 
lower threshold,” by affecting those producing as little as 101 sheets of paper, 
and required immediate self-identification to the public, rather than reporting 
to an agency.121  Second, Easterbrook questioned whether McConnell could 
 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 354. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Majors, 361 F.3d at 355.  “Reluctant, without clearer guidance from the Court, to 
interfere with state experimentation in the baffling and conflicted field of campaign finance law 
without guidance from authoritative precedent, we hold that the Indiana statute is constitutional.”  
Id. 
 118. Literally, “dubitante” means doubting.  A writing judge will usually label his opinion as 
dubitante if he or she doubted a legal point, but not the extent to be willing to state that it was 
wrong.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 537 (8th ed. 2004). 
 119. Majors, 361 F.3d at 356–58 (Easterbrook, J. dubitante). 
 120. Id. at 356. 
 121. Id.  Later in the opinion, Easterbrook stressed that the importance of the BCRA’s 
regulations was greater, as they imposed requirements on major expenditures for nationwide 
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rightly be said to bear on McIntyre, when McConnell did not discuss the 
McIntyre case or even mention any of the other leading cases on anonymous 
political speech.122 
Third, in Easterbrook’s interpretation of McConnell, the Supreme Court’s 
decision to uphold the disclosure requirements of the BCRA was highly 
dependent on the statute’s “fidelity” to the imperatives of curtailing public 
corruption while allowing room for expression.123  But, Indiana’s statute did 
not seem to display a similar level of “fidelity” to these imperatives, and failed 
to attach any “weight to the risks borne by supporters of unpopular 
candidates.”124 
While the majority’s opinion in Majors implies that potential voters are 
best served by knowing the source behind their communication, the dubitante 
opinion sponsors the opposite perspective on forced disclosure—that the public 
may ultimately be better served by an anonymous message: 
Anyway, we must consider the possibility that anonymity promotes a focus on 
the strength of the argument rather than the identity of the speaker; this is a 
reason why Madison, Hamilton, and Jay chose to publish The Federalist 
anonymously.  Instead of having to persuade New Yorkers that his roots in 
Virginia should be overlooked, Madison could present the arguments and let 
the reader evaluate them on merit.125 
Further, people who may choose to publish anonymously—perhaps for fear of 
retaliation or desire to protect their privacy—realize that the consumers of the 
message “discount” it because they do not know the source.126  To 
Easterbrook, it is possible to allow a greater right to anonymous speech 
without imposing serious burdens on those evaluating the message. 
2. ACLU of Nevada v. Heller 
The challenged Nevada statute required any person responsible for paying 
for the publication of any material or information relating to an election, 
candidate, or any question on a ballot to identify her name and address on any 
published printed or written matter or any photograph.127  The American Civil 
 
elections, while Indiana’s statute placed great burdens in the much less significant setting.  Id. at 
358. 
 122. Id. at 357. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Majors, 361 F.3d at 357. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id.  This perception contributed to the McIntyre rule.  514 U.S. 334, 348 n.11 (1995) 
(“People are intelligent enough to evaluate the source of an anonymous writing.  They can see it 
is anonymous.  They know it is anonymous.  They can evaluate its anonymity along with its 
message, as long as they are permitted, as they must be, to read that message.”). 
 127. NEV. REV. STAT. § 294A.320(1)(a) (2003).  The statute imposed different requirements 
for advertising by the candidates themselves. 
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Liberties Union (ACLU) and its executive director brought a First Amendment 
facial overbreadth challenge to the statute.128  The district court granted 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that the state’s interests 
of promoting truthfulness in campaign advertising, increasing the wealth of 
information available to the electorate, and preserving the integrity of the 
election process by preventing actual and perceived corruption were 
sufficiently compelling.129 
Before analyzing the ACLU’s First Amendment concerns, the Ninth 
Circuit considered the state’s argument for a narrowing construction, 
construing the statute to apply only to “express advocacy,” that is, to 
communications expressly advocating for or against a particular outcome in a 
candidate election or ballot measure referenda.130  At first, the court stated that 
a narrowing construction would have little import in light of McConnell, 
because that case, at least as interpreted by the Ninth Circuit, clarified that “the 
line between ‘express’ and all other election-related speech is not 
constitutionally material.”131  Nevertheless, the court entertained Nevada’s 
narrowing construction arguments, but concluded that even if the distinction 
were still relevant after McConnell, the language of the Nevada statute was not 
fairly susceptible to the state’s proposed limitation.132 
As a starting point to its First Amendment analysis, the court made clear 
that Nevada’s statue involved the direct regulation of content of political 
speech, thus meriting strict scrutiny analysis.133  The court stated that the 
McIntyre decision would control the determination of this case, noting the 
many similarities between the Nevada statute and the Ohio statute in 
McIntyre.134  As in McIntyre, the state legislature had made a “serious, direct 
intrusion on First Amendment values.”135  As part of its rationale, the court 
 
 128. ACLU of Nev. v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979, 983 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 985–87. 
 131. Id. at 985 (citing McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 193–94 (2003) 
(rejecting “the notion that the First Amendment requires Congress to treat so-called issue 
advocacy differently from express advocacy”)).  In 1987 the Ninth Circuit defined “express 
advocacy” as “that speech which is directed to influence a particular outcome of an election, as 
opposed to issue advocacy that focuses on the merits of a particular issue without regard for an 
election outcome.”  Id.  (citing Fed. Election Comm’n v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857, 864 (9th Cir. 
1987)). 
 132. Id. at 987. 
 133. Heller,  378 F.3d at 987–88.  “The most exacting scrutiny test is applied to regulations 
that suppress, disadvantage, or impose different burdens upon speech on the basis of its content, 
and to laws that compel speakers to utter or distribute speech bearing a particular message.”  16A 
AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 460 (1998).  Under exacting scrutiny, a statute will be upheld 
only if it serves an overriding state interest and is narrowly tailored to serve that state interest.  Id. 
 134. Id. at 987–89. 
 135. Id. at 988. 
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highlighted several of the arguments for anonymity: it protects an advocate 
from retaliation, protects her privacy, and allows her to express her arguments 
without the potentially distracting mark of her identity.136 
The court next considered the state’s purported compelling interests in 
making such a direct intrusion on First Amendment values.  The state’s 
primary argument was that its statute was distinguishable from the one the 
Supreme Court found unconstitutional in McIntyre because Nevada’s statute 
contained an exception for a natural person acting without cooperation of any 
business or social organization.137  The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that 
McIntyre was especially sympathetic to the individual, but was unconvinced 
that excluding a lone actor from the statute’s coverage would save it from 
constitutional peril.138  Because of the wording of various provisions of the 
statute, the exception was actually quite narrow,139 and none of the rationales 
for protecting an individual anonymous speaker are less pertinent to an 
anonymous business or organization.140 
In the alternative, Nevada argued that its interests were more compelling 
than those advanced by Ohio in McIntyre and that the post-McIntyre case law 
demanded the upholding of the statute.141  Each of Nevada’s three proffered 
state interests was unequivocally rejected by the Ninth Circuit. 
The state first argued that the statute was justified because of the state’s 
interest in fostering an informed electorate.142  The court quickly pointed out 
that this exact state interest was found insufficient in McIntyre143 and Nevada 
had set forth no persuasive factual distinction between its statute and the one at 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 989; see NEV. REV. STAT. § 294A.320(2)(c) (2003). 
 138. Heller, 378 F.3d at 989. 
 139. For example, the exception applied to only “a natural person who acts independently,” so 
even two individuals, working together but uninvolved with any organization, would be required 
to disclose their identities under the statute.  § 294A.320(2)(c) (emphasis added); see also Heller, 
378 F.3d at 989. 
 140. A group is just as likely as an individual to believe its ideas are more persuasive without 
their identification immediately attached to them.  Heller, 378 F.3d. at 989–90.  Also, “[l]ike 
other choice-of-word and format decisions, the presence or absence of information identifying the 
speaker is no less a content choice for a group or an individual cooperating with a group than it is 
for an individual speaking alone.”  Id. at 990. 
 141. Id. at 991. 
 142. Id. at 993.  This purported state interest is labeled by many as the “voter competence 
rationale.”  See Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors: The Real Threat to 
Campaign Disclosure Statutes 3 (June 2004) (Univ. Southern Cal. Public Policy Research Paper 
No. 03-13), http://ssrn.com/abstract=424603 (arguing that improving competence is among the 
most persuasive rationales for requiring campaign disclosures).  “Disclosure laws can . . . make 
relevant and credible information available to voters—or to informational entrepreneurs like the 
media and challengers in elections who act as intermediaries—at a time it can be helpful in the 
voting decision.”  Id. at 8. 
 143. Heller, 378 F.3d at 993. 
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issue in that case.144  The court opined that the actual effect of Nevada’s statute 
could just as likely have been a “worse-informed, not a better-informed” 
electorate because if anonymous speech were banned, then some valuable 
viewpoints may go entirely unpresented.145  Further, the court made the 
practical point that adding the name and address of the organization to the 
communication—the requirements for compliance with the Nevada statute—
will in many cases not provide truly useful information.146 
The court did recognize that the informational rationale has been found 
legitimate by the Supreme Court in ruling on campaign regulations that require 
off-communication reporting of expenditures made to finance those 
communications, like the regulations at issue in Buckley v. Valeo and 
McConnell.147  These rulings were easily distinguished because off-
communication reporting does not involve the direct regulation of a 
communication’s content.148  The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the Supreme 
Court’s upholding of the off-communication reporting statutes, which are less 
intrusive on free speech rights, established that an on-communication 
identification was inappropriate in this setting.149 
The state’s second justification for the statute was its interest in preventing 
fraud.150  The court rejected this argument because the statute was overly broad 
to serve this interest in that it regulated both true and false speech the same.151  
The statute was also ill-fitted to prevent fraud because it contained an 
exception for communication by candidates and political parties.152  In the 
court’s view, there was no reason for the state to think that candidates or 
political committees would be less likely to engage in fraud; “if anything, one 
would expect the opposite to be the case.”153 
The state’s final argument for the statute’s legitimacy was that the statute 
directly advanced “the state’s ability to investigate and enforce other campaign 
finance laws that are, in fact, constitutional.”154  The court found the self-
identification requirement to be a poor fit with Nevada’s campaign finance 
laws, because the statute did not require any statement of how much money 
 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 994. 
 147. Id. at 994–95. 
 148. Heller, 378 F.3d at 994. 
 149. Id. at 994–95.  To the Heller court, the availability of the alternative requirement was 
very persuasive.  The Court reasoned that with off-communication reporting regulations, the 
imposition on First Amendment rights is less onerous and the fit between the regulations and the 
interests they serve is superior.  Id. at 994. 
 150. Id. at 995. 
 151. Id. at 995–97. 
 152. Id. at 996–97. 
 153. Heller, 378 F.3d at 996–97. 
 154. Id. at 997. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2006] THEORETICAL SPLITS AND CONSISTENT RESULTS 945 
was contributed to make the publication.155  Once again, the Nevada statute 
failed to survive the narrow tailoring requirement of strict scrutiny analysis, as 
the statute reached a substantial quantity of speech not subject to the reporting 
and disclosure requirements it purportedly helped to enforce.156 
C. Analysis 
1. Are Majors and Heller Reconcilable? 
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit held that Nevada’s statute was not well 
tailored to meet any of the State’s proffered interests.157  Still, the Ninth Circuit 
did not foreclose the possibility that an on-publication identification 
requirement could survive constitutional muster.158  Is it possible that these two 
circuit court decisions are actually in harmony—or at least not in discord—
with one another? 
As a starting point, it is important to recognize that the Nevada statute was 
significantly more broad than the Indiana statute.  Indiana’s statute only 
regulated communications related to candidate elections, and further, only 
those election communications that “expressly advocate” for the election or 
defeat of a clearly identified candidate.159  The statute required that the persons 
who paid for the communication disclose their identities on the face of the 
communication.160 
Likewise, the Nevada statute required the disclosure of the person or 
persons paying for the communication, but also required that their addresses be 
included.161  In addition, the Nevada statute regulated many more types of 
communications, placing requirements on “any material or information 
relating to an election.”162  As the Ninth Circuit noted, the broad language of 
this statute “reache[d] objective publications that concern any aspect of an 
election . . . for example, discussions of election procedures, analyses of 
 
 155. Id. at 998. 
 156. Id. at 999. 
 157. Id. at 1000. 
 158. Heller, 378 F.3d at 1000. 
Our conclusion that the Nevada statute at issue here is not narrowly tailored to assist the 
state in enforcing other campaign finance laws should not in any way suggest that an on-
publication identification requirement could never be narrowly tailored to achieve this 
goal.  As we have developed, Nevada’s statute is particularly ill-designed for this purpose. 
Id. 
 159. IND. CODE § 3-9-3-2.5(b)(1) (2002). 
 160. Id. at § 3-9-3-2.5(d). 
 161. NEV. REV. STAT. § 294A.320(1)(a) (2003). 
 162. Id.  As explained above in notes 130–31 and the accompanying text, the “express 
advocacy” difference between the Indiana and Nevada statutes is likely insignificant in light of 
McConnell. 
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polling results, and nonpartisan get-out-the vote drives . . . .”163  The Nevada 
statute also regulated speech relating to both candidates and ballot issues, 
where Indiana’s statute was limited to candidate-related communications.164 
It is this final distinction, between candidate and issue advocacy, that has 
been a constitutionally significant dividing point for courts deciding on the 
validity of identity disclosure statutes.165  The chief difference between 
regulations of candidate-related speech and issue-related speech is the strength 
of the state interests behind the regulations.  With candidate elections, the state 
has an interest in preventing libel and other fraudulent statements.166  These 
concerns are significantly diminished with respect to issues on ballot 
measures.167  With candidate elections, the state also has an interest in avoiding 
the risk and appearance of corruption.168 
While these state interests have been given legitimacy by the courts, 
especially in the context of financial reporting requirements like those under 
the Federal Election Campaign Act,169 they are far from ironclad with respect 
to on-communication disclosure.  For one, states are able to prevent 
defamation through the enforcement of general fraud and libel statutes as well 
as common law torts.170  These laws, coupled with state financial contribution 
reporting requirements, are arguably sufficient to serve the state interest 
directly, rather than doing so indirectly by “indiscriminately outlawing a 
category of speech.”171 
 
 163. Heller, 378 F.3d at 986. 
 164. Id. at 986, 1002. 
 165. See, e.g., Seymour v. Elections Enforcement Comm’n, 762 A.2d 880, 892 (Conn. 2000). 
 166. See Sherri L. Eyer, Comment, From Whence it Comes—Is the Message More Revealing 
Than the Messenger? McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 115 S. Ct. 1511 (1995), 100 DICK. L. 
REV. 1051, 1069 (1996). 
 167. See Heller, 378 F.3d at 997 (acknowledging that McIntyre did recognize a legitimate 
state concern for fraud and libel prevention during election campaigns, but refusing to defer to 
that state interest with respect to the Nevada statute because “[i]t covers ballot proposition 
elections, in which libel is a remote concern”). 
 168. In Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court fully endorsed this rationale as justification for 
imposing reporting requirements for financial contributions to candidates.  424 U.S. 1, 66–67 
(1976).  The reporting requirements “deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance of 
corruption by exposing large contributions and expenditures to the light of publicity.”  Id. at 67.  
The exposure might deter candidates and contributors from misusing the funds, and “[a] public 
armed with information about a candidate’s most generous supporters is better able to detect any 
post-election special favors that may be given in return.”  Id. 
 169. See, e.g., id. at 66–68; Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263. 
 170. For example, in McIntyre, the Court struck down the disclosure statute at issue, at least 
in part, because other provisions of Ohio’s statutory and common law prohibited the making or 
disseminating of false statements.  514 U.S. 334, 349, 350 n.13 (1995). 
 171. Id. at 357.  Also, in Heller, the Ninth Circuit relied on Riley v. National Federation of 
the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988), which struck down a state statute that imposed disclosure 
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If one were to accept the differences in candidate and issue 
communications, then the two holdings probably can be reconciled.  It is on 
this distinction that the Ninth Circuit in Heller conceded that the result in its 
case is not technically at odds with Majors in the Seventh Circuit.172  However, 
the Heller opinion implied that if the Ninth Circuit were to actually evaluate 
the Indiana statute, it would not have reached the same conclusion as the 
Seventh Circuit.  The balancing scale of the Seventh Circuit decision tipped on 
the distinction between issue referenda and candidate elections, arguing that 
McIntyre’s protections only extended to issue communications.173  While the 
Ninth Circuit was willing to accept, arguendo, such a reading of McIntyre, the 
court did not appear at all convinced that the distinction is dispositive on the 
constitutionality of these types of regulations of campaign speech.  In a half-
hearted effort to distinguish the Majors decision, the Heller court reasoned that 
“[Majors] posited that after McConnell, McIntyre is limited to statutes 
precluding anonymous speech regarding ballot questions,” yet “we are not 
convinced that McConnell so narrowed McIntyre, [but] if it did, the Nevada 
Statute falls on the McIntyre side of the line and, even on [Majors’] analysis, is 
invalid.”174 
2. Underlying Disagreements 
So yes, the two decisions do not technically “clash” with each other.  But 
to end the analysis of these opinions here would be unsatisfying, as the two 
courts vary in their paths to these conclusions, with these variances 
exemplifying much of the ambiguous and unsettled law surrounding 
anonymous campaign literature. 
a. Difference Between On-Communication Disclosure of Identity and 
Later Reporting of Identity 
One of the more glaring differences in the two courts’ approaches is their 
opinions on the significance of a statute’s requiring that a political advertiser 
 
requirements designed to prevent corruption among professional fundraisers soliciting on behalf 
of charitable organizations.  378 F.3d at 995.  In Riley, the Court stated: 
  In striking down this portion of the Act, we do not suggest that States must sit idly by 
and allow their citizens to be defrauded.  North Carolina has an antifraud law, and we 
presume that law enforcement officers are ready and able to enforce it.  Further North 
Carolina may constitutionally require fundraisers to disclose certain financial information 
to the State . . . . If this is not the most efficient means of preventing fraud, we reaffirm 
simply and emphatically that the First Amendment does not permit the State to sacrifice 
speech for efficiency. 
487 U.S. at 795. 
 172. See Heller, 378 F.3d at 1002. 
 173. Majors v. Abell, 361 F.3d 349, 353–54 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 174. Heller, 378 F.3d at 1002. 
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disclose her name on her communication, as opposed to some off-
communication reporting requirement.  In Majors, the Seventh Circuit did not 
regard this distinction as constitutionally determinative when evaluating past 
precedent.  The Majors court did claim to take “considerable pause” of the 
distinction,175 citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Buckley v. American 
Constitutional Law Foundation.176 
In Buckley v. ACLF, the Supreme Court invalidated a Colorado law that 
required circulators petitioning regarding issue initiatives to wear identification 
badges.177  One part of the challenged Colorado regulation required paid 
circulators to wear a badge indicating their name, employer, and the 
employer’s telephone number.178  Another section of the regulation, which was 
not challenged in the case, required each circulator to submit with the petition 
and file with the secretary of state’s office an affidavit that included the 
circulator’s name and address.179  The Supreme Court struck down the badge 
requirement, in part because the affidavit requirement served the state’s 
interests while imposing a lesser risk of retaliation or judgment on the 
circulators, and imposing a lesser imposition on the individual’s rights.180 
Despite Buckley v. ACLF’s implication that a reporting requirement will 
sufficiently serve a state’s interests, the Majors court distinguished the 
Supreme Court’s reasoning in Buckley v. ACLF because Colorado’s 
requirement was “inapplicable to elections of candidates,” the only category of 
speech that the Indiana statute covered.181  Majors placed negligible reliance 
on Buckley v. ACLF, primarily relying instead on McConnell, a case that 
pertained only to reporting requirements.182 
The Ninth Circuit in Heller concluded, though, that “it is not just that a 
speaker’s identity is revealed, but how and when that identity is revealed, that 
matters in a First Amendment analysis of a state’s regulation of political 
speech.”183  The court drew a hard line between on-communication self-
identification requirements and later-reporting requirements, labeling this 
distinction as “constitutionally determinative.”184  Not only did McIntyre draw 
 
 175. Majors, 361 F.3d at 354. 
 176. 525 U.S. 182 (1999). 
 177. Id. at 197–200. 
 178. Id. at 188 n.5. 
 179. Id. at 188–89 nn.6–8. 
 180. Id. at 198–200.  “While the affidavit reveals the name of the petition circulator and is a 
public record, it is tuned to the speaker’s interest as well as the State’s,” while the badge 
requirement “operates when reaction to the circulator’s message is immediate and ‘may be the 
most intense, emotional, and unreasoned.’  The affidavit, in contrast, does not expose the 
circulator to the risk of ‘heat of the moment’ harassment.”  Id.  (citations omitted). 
 181. Majors, 361 F.3d at 354. 
 182. See supra notes 121–22 and accompanying text. 
 183. ACLU of Nev. v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979, 991 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 184. Id. 
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upon this distinction to set it apart from Buckley v. Valeo,185 but Buckley v. 
ACLF also provides considerable support for the argument that the two types 
of regulations are in fact very different.186 
Further, Heller’s emphasis on this distinction was tied to concern over 
privacy interests and the argument that anonymity must be preserved for those 
who risk retaliation for their ideas.187  Heller also concluded that a requirement 
of on-communication disclosure is a content restriction, while reporting 
requirements are not, and that this difference determines the appropriate level 
of scrutiny:188 
Statutes like the one here at issue . . . must be, and have been, viewed as 
serious, content-based, direct proscription of political speech: If certain content 
appears on the communication, it may be circulated; if the content is absent, 
the communication is illegal and may not be circulated. 
  As a content-based limitation on core political speech, the Nevada Statute 
must receive the most “exacting scrutiny” under the First Amendment.189 
As the Ninth Circuit criticized, the Seventh Circuit never made a 
meaningful distinction between on-communication disclosure requirements 
and reporting requirements.  Oddly, while Majors did make some recognition 
of a difference between the two types of regulations,190 it did not pay heed to 
the distinction, and it allowed McConnell to dictate the outcome of its decision, 
despite the fact that the McConnell majority emphasized that disclosure to an 
agency did not include the content of the message.191 
b. Legitimacy of the Informational Rationale 
In defending legislation that unarguably infringes on free speech rights, 
like the Indiana and Nevada statutes, states often justify these regulations with 
 
 185. “Though such mandatory reporting undeniably impedes protected First Amendment 
activity, the intrusion is a far cry from compelled self-identification on all election-related 
writings.”  McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 355 (1995). 
 186. See supra notes 177–80 and accompanying text. 
 187. See Heller, 378 F.3d at 991–93.  For an argument that privacy concerns go largely 
unnoticed in analysis of disclosure requirements, especially financial disclosures, see William 
McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre’s Checkbook: Privacy Costs of Political Contribution Disclosure, 6 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 17–20 (2003). 
 188. Heller, 378 F.3d at 992. 
 189. Id.  The Majors opinion never made clear what level of scrutiny it was applying to the 
Indiana statute. 
 190. See supra notes 181–82. 
 191. See McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 201–02 (2003); see also Majors 
v. Abell, 361 F.3d 349, 357 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J., dubitante).  Judge Easterbrook could 
not commit to what import the distinction carried: “In Indiana the disclosure is affixed to the 
speech; the association is unavoidable; does this make a difference?  My colleagues think not; I 
am not so sure.”  Id. 
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a state interest in fostering an informed electorate.192  This justification is often 
referred to as “the informational rationale,” or the “voter competence 
rationale.”193  The legitimacy and proper role of this state interest in a court’s 
decision-making process is a matter of some scholarly contention.194  In 
Buckley v. Valeo, the informational rationale was one of three primary state 
interests that justified the financial disclosure requirements.195  However, in 
McIntyre, the Court treated the informational rationale with suspicion, finding 
that “[t]he simple interest in providing voters with additional relevant 
information does not justify a state requirement that a writer make statements 
or disclosures she would otherwise omit . . . Ohio’s informational interest is 
plainly insufficient to support the constitutionality of its disclosure 
requirement.”196 
Despite McIntyre’s seeming rejection of legitimacy of a state’s interest in 
voter competence as justifying a statute that requires a political advertiser to 
disclose her identity on her communication, the representatives of Indiana and 
 
 192. See Raleigh Hannah Levine, The (Un)informed Electorate: Insights into the Supreme 
Court’s Electoral Speech Cases, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 225, 227 (2003). 
 193. Id. at 226 n.2.  To some political scientists, voters are “competent” if they cast the same 
votes they would have had they possessed all available knowledge about the policy consequences 
of their decision.  Elisabeth R. Gerber & Arthur Lupia, Voter Competence in Direct Legislation 
Elections, in CITIZEN COMPETENCE AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS 147, 149 (Stephen L. Elkin 
& Karol Edward Soltan eds., 1999).  Gerber and Lupia argue that information about campaign 
spending can increase voter competence.  Id. at 152–59. 
 194. Compare Levine, supra note 192, at 290–93 (criticizing the Supreme Court’s willingness 
to infringe on political speech rights in order to advance the informed voting interest), with 
Garrett & Smith, supra note 142, at “Abstract” (arguing for well-formed disclosure statutes that 
can improve voter competence in elections because “[v]oters have limited time and attention, so 
they should be provided the information most crucial to improving their ability to vote 
consistently with their preferences”). 
 195. 424 U.S. 1, 66–68 (1976). 
 196. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 348–49 (1995).  It is possible that 
the Court was so willing to discount the voter competence rationale in McIntyre because it 
believed that the speech in that case was practically of minimal consequence to voters.  See 
Levine, supra note 192, at 254. 
[O]ne plausible way to read to read McIntyre is to say that the McIntyre Court believed 
that the anonymity itself was most informative because it signaled the reader to assign 
little or no weight to the position stated—opposition to a proposed school tax levy—and 
that, because voters would give it little credence, an anonymous campaign leaflet was 
unlikely to unduly influence a voter by causing her to vote against her personal 
conception of her own best interests and thus differently than she would with different 
information.  That is, while . . . the Court has often been willing to allow speech 
restrictions that it believes will promote informed voting, it saw no reason to restrict 
anonymous campaign leaflets.  It believed that voters would not pay them much mind 
precisely because they were anonymous and therefore that they would not have any 
significant effect on voter choice. 
Id. 
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Nevada both presented it as a compelling state interest that justified the 
regulations in Majors and Heller.197  However, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits 
weighed this interest differently. 
The Seventh Circuit’s opinion in Heller never made explicit its stance on 
the merits of the rationale up against the imposition of the on-communication 
disclosure requirement of the Indiana statute.  Through its analysis of 
McConnell’s implications on McIntyre and the immediate facts before it, 
though, the Seventh Circuit implied that the state’s interest in informing the 
electorate may be even more compelling when justifying on-communication 
disclosure requirements than when justifying reporting requirements.  
McConnell upheld the portions of the BCRA that required any person who 
contributes to the making of an ad to make certain disclosures to the Federal 
Election Commission.198  While on-communication disclosures may impose a 
greater intrusion on the freedom of political advocacy than later reporting, the 
court in Majors was persuaded that on-communication disclosures actually 
better fulfill the state’s informational interest, perhaps creating “a wash” in the 
balancing of individual rights and state interests: “But of course the very thing 
that makes reporting less inhibiting than notice in the ad itself—fewer people 
are likely to see the report than the notice—makes reporting a less effective 
method of conveying information that by hypothesis the voting public 
values.”199 
Ultimately, it was in reliance on McConnell that Majors deferred to the 
state’s interest of informing its voters in sanctioning the intrusion of the 
Indiana statute, all the while recognizing the imperfections of its own 
conclusion.200 
As an original matter it could be objected that speech and the press would no 
longer be free if the government could insist that every speaker and every 
writer add to his message information that the government deems useful to the 
intended audience for the message, and that it is arbitrary for the government 
to single out the identity of the writer or speaker and decree that that 
information, though no other that potential voters might value as much or 
 
 197. See Brief of State Commissioner Appellees and Supplemental Appendix at 14–19, 
Majors v. Abell, 361 F.3d 349 (7th Cir. 2004) (No. 02-2204), 2002 WL 32172589; Defendants–
Appellees’ Dean Heller, Secretary of State, Frankie Sue Del Papa, Attorney General, and State of 
Nevada Answering Brief at 27–29, ACLU v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 01-
15462), 2001 WL 34098271. 
 198. McConnell v. Federal Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 96 (2003). 
 199. Majors v. Abell, 361 F.3d 349, 353 (7th Cir. 2004).  The Ninth Circuit did not buy into 
this line of reasoning.  “Compared to communication-altering requirements such as the one 
imposed by the Nevada Statute, the imposition on freedom of speech of such reporting 
requirements is less, while the fit between the regulation and the interest it serves is superior.”  
ACLU of Nev. v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979, 994 (9th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added). 
 200. 361 F.3d at 355. 
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more, must be disclosed.  But the Supreme Court crossed that Rubicon in 
McConnell.201 
Much different than in Majors, the Ninth Circuit in Heller directly 
confronted Nevada’s purported interest in informing its electorate.  Closely 
following McIntyre, Heller thoroughly disposed of the informational 
rationale.202  Heller not only concluded that Nevada’s informational interest 
was not sufficiently strong to support the constitutionality of its disclosure 
requirement,203 but it also speculated that, whether justified or not, the statute 
simply would not bring about a better-informed electorate.204 
Also, rather than assigning any import to the fact that on-communication 
disclosure requirements may serve the state informational interest better than 
later-reporting requirements, as the Majors opinion implied,205 Heller drew a 
much different inference from the Supreme Court’s recognition that reporting 
requirements serve the informational interest.  That a later-reporting 
requirement would serve the informational interest at all goes to proving that 
the on-communication identification requirement is not narrowly tailored: 
  That reporting and disclosure requirements have been consistently upheld 
as comporting with the First Amendment based on the importance of providing 
information to the electorate therefore supports rather than detracts from our 
conclusion that McIntyre’s rejection of the additional information rationale 
remains binding on us. . . . The availability of the less speech-restrictive 
reporting and disclosure requirement confirms that a statute like the one here at 
issue cannot survive the applicable narrow tailoring standard.206 
The Ninth Circuit’s approach to the state interest of informing the 
electorate is more persuasive for a variety of reasons.  Heller adheres to 
McIntyre, which seems completely on point for the issue.  In McIntyre, the 
Supreme Court made clear that the state’s interest in fostering an informed 
electorate does not justify the serious intrusion on First Amendment rights that 
would be caused by requiring political advocates to disclose their identities on 
their communications.207  Even if the Majors court could distinguish certain 
 
 201. Id.  It is easy to imagine that the legitimacy of the voter competence rationale may have 
been a sticking point among the judges deciding Majors.  Judge Easterbrook wrote in his 
dubitante opinion that “[a]rguments that speech may be regulated to protect the audience from 
misunderstanding should fare poorly and outside of electioneering have faired poorly.”  Id. at 
357. 
 202. Heller, 378 F.3d at 993–95. 
 203. Id. at 993. 
 204. Id.  The thrust of the court’s argument was that if anonymous communications were 
banned, especially as much as the broad Nevada statute banned, some useful ideas would go 
unsaid, and “[t]he result could be a worse-informed, not a better-informed, electorate.”  Id. 
 205. Majors, 361 F.3d at 351–52; see infra note 208 and accompanying text. 
 206. Heller, 378 F.3d at 994–95. 
 207. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 348 (1995). 
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aspects of its analysis of the Indiana statute from McIntyre because of the 
differences between issue and candidate speech, the validity of the state 
informational interest as justification for on-communication disclosure would 
be the same for candidate or issue publications because, as the Majors court 
itself recognized, “the public interest in knowing the source of an anonymous 
contribution to the debate” is probably as great in one case as in the other.208  
McIntyre rejected the informational interest when it came to on-
communication identification requirements.209  Why the Seventh Circuit broke 
from McIntyre’s analysis—even after implying that the state interest in 
informing the electorate is probably the same for candidate and issue 
publications—is not entirely clear. 
The Seventh Circuit’s deference to the state’s informational rationale is 
unsettling for other reasons.  There is an underlying paternalism in the 
“informational interest,” because regulations at its hands imply what voters 
should and should not be considering in informing themselves, and what might 
or might not unduly influence them.  The Supreme Court has spoken out 
against such paternalistic measures in other contexts, stating that “[t]he very 
purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public authority from assuming 
a guardianship of the public mind through regulating the press, speech, and 
religion.”210 
Further, it is disconcerting that a court is willing to restrict such a 
fundamental right as free speech at the hands of a state’s informational interest, 
without any empirical proof that there is any actual increase in voter 
competence because of these disclosures.211  Instead, the Majors court only 
made reference to a speaker’s identity as being information “that by hypothesis 
the voting public values.”212  Yes, the Supreme Court has recognized that a 
state has an interest in ensuring fair elections.213  But, when considering a 
statute that hinders the exceptional right of free speech with a content 
proscription of author identification, it seems that a court should demand more 
 
 208. Majors, 361 F.3d at 351–52. 
 209. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 348. 
 210. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring); see also Riley v. 
Nat’l Federation of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 793 (1988) (“[T]he government, even with the purest 
of motives, may not substitute its judgment as to how best to speak for that of speakers and 
listeners; free and robust debate cannot thrive if directed by the government.”). 
 211. For a highly critical review of the Supreme Court’s recognition of the informational 
interest, see Levine, supra note 192.  Professor Levine cites many criticisms of the Court’s 
deference to a state’s informational interest, including the lack of any evidence about voter 
confusion.  “[T]he Court has allowed these restrictions on the basis of mere speculation and 
intuition as to their effects on informed voting, rather than properly requiring empirical 
evidence.”  Id. at 289. 
 212. Majors, 361 F.3d at 353 (emphasis added). 
 213. See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
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evidence before conceding that the state’s interest in informing its electorate is 
sufficiently compelling. 
c. Theoretical Differences on Societal Value of Anonymity 
Embedded in the two circuits’ approaches in Majors and Hellers are 
certain, apparently driving assumptions about anonymity in general, and how 
people are or are not served by it. 
In Majors, the majority’s assumption seemed to be that people are “better 
served” by knowing who is speaking—that this is information that people 
desire in order to evaluate the message.  The court cited the “avidity with 
which candidates for public office seek endorsements” as proof that “the 
identity of a candidate’s supporters—and opponents—is information that the 
voting public values highly.”214  Disclosure is favored because it produces 
more information, and society is better able to judge an idea the more 
information it has.215 
In contrast, the Heller opinion approached the problem with an 
understanding that people may actually be better served by anonymity.  
Immediate author identification may effect a disservice to a message’s 
recipient: “[F]ar from enhancing the reader’s evaluation of a message, 
identifying the publisher can interfere with that evaluation by requiring the 
introduction of potentially extraneous information at the very time the reader 
encounters the substance of the message.”216  The requirement of disclosure 
may deter communication, especially from the margins, where the risk of 
social judgment and retaliation may be at the greatest.217  Anonymity may not 
only produce better information, as explained above, but it may also produce 
more information.218 
There may be no real resolution to this debate.219  Both approaches 
ultimately rest on the rationale that a democracy thrives if people have a 
meaningful, informed choice to exercise.220  The fact remains, though, that 
even if political advocates are able to publish their ideas anonymously, it does 
not mean that they all will.  Anonymity is just as much a part of a message as a 
statement of its author’s identity, and people can and will recognize that.221  
 
 214. Majors, 361 F.3d at 352. 
 215. A speaker’s identity is “additional information useful to the consumer.”  Id.  “[T]o 
require only the reporting of the advertiser’s name to a public agency . . . would . . . reduce the 
amount of information possessed by voters.”  Id. at 355. 
 216. ACLU of Nev. v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979, 994 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 217. Id. at 988. 
 218. See id. 
 219. See Wieland, supra note 28, at 627 (“The problem is that both arguments—that 
anonymity tends to promote truth, and that disclosure tends to promote truth—are correct.”). 
 220. See id. 
 221. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 348 n.11 (1995). 
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People can evaluate anonymity along with the message and discount that 
message to whatever degree they deem appropriate.  If the First Amendment is 
truly meant to foster a “marketplace of ideas” and “the best test of truth is the 
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market,”222 
then the best approach affords greater protection for anonymous political 
speech and allows citizens to make the choice about whether anonymity will 
sink or swim in the marketplace of ideas. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should again confront the problem of anonymous 
political speech and state regulations that require political advocates to include 
their identities on their publications.  Until it does, lower courts are almost 
certain to take widely varying approaches to evaluating constitutionality of 
these statutes, such as those taken by the Seventh and Ninth Circuits in their 
Majors and Heller decisions.  As Majors and Heller prove, even after the 
Supreme Court’s 2003 ruling in McConnell, it is remains unclear what 
variances in a statute requiring on-communication identification might make it 
sufficiently narrowly tailored under McIntyre.  Perhaps there is a 
constitutionally determinative distinction between candidate speech and issue 
speech, a distinction that keeps the technical holdings of Majors and Heller 
from being a true Circuit split.  But, the soundness of this distinction is far 
from certain.  As Judge Easterbrook lamented in Majors, “How can legislators 
or the judges of other courts determine what is apt to tip the balance?”223 
After all, the Seventh and Ninth Circuit analyses differed on the 
significance of requiring someone to attach his identity to his communication, 
as opposed to reporting his identity to an agency.  The courts also afforded 
much different weight to the state’s interest in informing the electorate, and 
were steered by different value judgments on the goods and evils of anonymity 
in political speech. 
When the Supreme Court again confronts the issue, it should heed the 
approach of the Ninth Circuit in making clear that the intrusion of requiring a 
speaker to attach his identity to his publication is much more significant than 
financial reporting, and demands a much stronger state interest—or at least 
some showing that reporting requirements are an inadequate means of 
informing the electorate—in order to uphold an on-communication 
identification requirement. 
Of course anonymity has not always been used for noble purposes.  It is 
impossible to know why my neighborhood’s mystery pamphleteer did not 
attach her name to her viewpoints on the Missouri constitutional amendment.  
Perhaps she knew that her opinions were controversial, and she did not want to 
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subject herself to the harassment of her neighbors.  Most probably did not 
agree with the pamphleteer’s specific viewpoints.  Some were probably deeply 
offended by them.  But, it is this very type of challenge to the mainstream for 
which the right to anonymity should be safeguarded.  The expression of even 
outrageous views can be productive—even if all of the neighbors emphatically 
disagreed with the pamphlet’s position, it likely at least encouraged them to 
process their own views, maybe changing those views or solidifying them 
along the way.  Or, perhaps the neighbors chose to discount the pamphlet 
completely because they did not know where it came from.  But, at least there 
was an opportunity to consider it.  It is this opportunity that is central to the 
marketplace of ideas concept of the First Amendment and crucial to the 
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